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The idea that this country may acquire territories any-
where upon the earth, by conquest or treaty, and hold them
as mere colonies or provinces, - the people inhabiting them
to enjoy only such rights as Congress chooses to accord to
them, - is wholly inconsistent with the spirit and genius, as
well as with the words, of the Constitution.'
I. INTRODUCTION: AN ANACHRONISTIC INTERPRETATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION RESTRICTS THE FRANCHISE
OF AMERICAN CITIZENS RESIDING IN
UNITED STATES TERRITORIES
The Constitution of the United States of America structures
the government and endows United States citizens with certain
inalienable rights, both express2 and implied. The Supreme
Court's current interpretation of the Constitution with respect to
the United States territories, however, contravenes that spirit of
representative democracy which the Constitution itself embodies.
In a line of decisions known as the Insular Cases,4 interpreting the
Constitution's Territorial Clause,' the judiciary effectively created
a sub-class of American citizenship.
A. The Supreme Court and the Territorial Clause:
The Supreme Court Grants Congress Expansive
Power Over the American Territories
The current Supreme Court's adherence to the anachronistic,
1. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 380 (1901) (Harlan J. dissenting).
2. Express rights are specifically granted in the Constitution (e.g., the Eighth
Amendment guarantees the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment). U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, cl. 2.
3. The Supreme Court has also found implied rights in the Constitution based on
the structure and foundation of our government (e.g., the fundamental right to
privacy under substantive due process). See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1963) (the fundamental right to vote
under Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Interference from the
federal government and Congress with rights of citizens, as deemed fundamental
under the Equal Protection Clause, can also be contested through the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.; see also Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
4. A series of cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1901 and 1922
interpreting Congress's power under the Territorial Clause. See Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901); see also Dorr v. U.S., 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298 (1922).
5. The Territorial Clause states, "The United States Congress shall have power
to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or
other property belonging to the United States . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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racist, and imperialist6 rhetoric espoused in the century old Insu-
lar Cases enables Congress and the lower federal courts to deny
United States citizens residing in American territories7 the right
to vote in national elections. Further, continued adherence to this
outdated interpretation of the Territorial Clause is at odds with
current constitutional jurisprudence on federal franchise. The
Supreme Court currently deems franchise a fundamental right of
American citizenship.8
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter
in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right
to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner
is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any
alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized.9
The effect of the Insular Cases, viewed in conjunction with
modern Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning franchise, cre-
ates a legal conflict. The continued adherence to the Insular
Cases, when voting is deemed a fundamental right, creates a tor-
tured and unjust legal formulation: voting in federal elections is a
crucial, fundamental right of American citizenship except when
the citizen happens to live in a United States territory.
B. Congress and the Territorial Clause: Congress Can
Characterize Fundamental Rights Differently for
U.S. Citizens Living in the American Territories
The Court's interpretation of the Territorial Clause in the
Insular Cases remains unmodified; Congress has full plenary
power over the territories subject only to an outdated concept of
6. "The Insular Cases should be placed not only in the context of American
expansionism [imperialism], but also within the sadly rich history of American racism
.... " Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should be Expanded to Include the Insular
Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT 241, 257
(2000).
7. In this Comment, the author uses the term "territories" to refer to the five
island communities governed by the United States, despite that only three of the five
are actually designated territories. The political position of all these communities is
the same in reference to the legal issues raised in this Comment, regardless of the
territorial or commonwealth designation. For precision, these communities are the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
the Territory of the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Territory of Guam, and the Territory of
American Samoa.
8. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1963); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970).
9. Reynolds, 377 U.S at 561-62.
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fundamental rights. Over one hundred years ago, in Downes v.
Bidwell,"° Justice Brown set forth the rights that the Court would
protect despite Congress expansive power under the Territorial
Clause." The 'fundamental' rights of territorial residents
included:
[Tihe rights to one's own religious opinion and to a public
expression of them [sic], or, as sometimes said, to worship
God according to the dictates of your own conscience; the
right to personal liberty and individual property; to free-
dom of speech and the press; to free access to the courts of
justice, to due process of law and to equal protection of the
laws; to immunities from unreasonable searches and
seizures, as well as cruel and unusual punishment; and to
such other immunities as are indispensable to a free
government. 2
Justice Brown continued, however, by declaring that the right
of "suffrage and ... the particular methods of procedure pointed
out in the Constitution, which are peculiar to Anglo-Saxon juris-
prudence..." were excluded from the fundamental rights owing to
the citizens in the American territories. 3 Thus the Supreme
Court's construction of fundamental rights in the Insular Cases
omitted franchise rights. 4 Therefore, because the Court did not
deem these rights fundamental with respect to the territories,
Congress was not obligated to, and has not, extended franchise.
10. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282-3 (1901).
11. These rights were also discussed by the Court in Downes under the headings of
'natural' and 'personal' rights.
12. Downes, 182 U.S. at 282-3.
13. Id. Trial by jury was the main procedural right litigated in the Insular Cases,
and the Supreme Court consistently held that territorial residents did not enjoy the
right without Congress' express grant. See Dorr v. U.S., 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (holding
the right to trial by jury did not exist in the Philippines); see also Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298 (1922) (holding the right to trial by jury did not exist in Puerto Rico). It
is worth noting that the right to trial by jury has subsequently been granted to
territorial residents.
14. This characterization occurred despite another Constitutional guarantee that
"all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S.
CONST. amend XIV, § 1 cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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C. The Lower Federal Judiciary and the Territorial
Clause: The Current Positions of the Supreme
Court and Congress Legally Require the Federal
Judiciary to Deny the Citizens in the American
Territories Equal Franchise Rights
Because the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of the
Constitution, the lower federal court decisions are controlled by
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Territorial Clause in
the Insular Cases.15 Thus, federal district courts can dismiss the
disenfranchisement claims of territorial residents, because the
Supreme Court has not held that the right to vote is fundamental
for American citizens residing in the territories, nor has it been
extended by Congress.
In fact, lower federal courts have denied the franchise to terri-
torial residents,"9 anchoring their decisions in Article II, § 1, cl. 2
of the Constitution, which establishes the Electoral College 7 and
gives states the right to appoint electors in Presidential elec-
tions." Since these residents do not have a fundamental right to
vote, according to the Supreme Court and Congress, it follows that
they lack the right to name Presidential electors. 9 As such, where
no right exists, there is no remedy.
The Supreme Court, however, ostensibly repudiated this
resultant type of second-class citizenship when the doctrine of
15. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding the Supreme
Court is the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution, the Supreme law of the land, and as
such, its precedent controls lower court decisions, and also holding that courts have
the power of judicial review to determine the constitutionality of the actions of the
other branches of government). To orient the Insular Cases in the history of
constitutional jurisprudence, it is of note that these cases were decided by the same
Supreme Court which crafted the doctrine of 'separate but equal' in Plessey v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
16. See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied
514 U.S. 1049 (1995); see also Guam v. United States, 744 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1984).
17. The Electoral College section states, "Each state shall appoint, in such a
manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors . . . ." U.S. Const.
Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
18. Note that the language does not say only states shall appoint electors. The
District of Columbia is not a state and it has presidential electors.
19. In Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution does not guarantee each individual citizen the right to have their vote
counted. Instead, the Court's holding rested on the assumption that each states'
electors will represent the aggregate of the individual voters' interests. So, even if a
citizen does not have the right to have his individual vote counted, the American
citizens residing in United States territories would have the right to have appointed
electors represent their interests in presidential elections if the right to vote was
deemed fundamental by the Supreme Court.
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'separate but equal'20 was eradicated in 1954.21 Thus, it is
unthinkable that territorial residents continue to be disen-
franchised, an apparent vestige of the United States' era of colo-
nial expansion. Irrefutably, Congress would never act in a
similar fashion to abridge the right to vote of non-territorial
citizens.23
This Comment examines generally the injustice of the current
voting status of territorial residents. Second, this Comment dis-
cusses the historical and socio-cultural background of the racist
and imperialist rhetoric expressed in the Insular Cases. Third,
the Comment analyzes the impact of the Insular decisions on Con-
gress's ability to deny territorial residents fundamental rights of
national citizenship. Fourth, in both rationale and effect, this
Comment explores the 'Insular' jurisprudence as hopelessly out-
dated Constitutional law under the contemporary judicial and
congressional trend of expanding voting power. This analysis
demonstrates that the current policy of the United States regard-
ing voter enfranchisement is in direct opposition to the existing
interpretation of the Territorial Clause, set forth in the Insular
Cases, whereby territorial residents are denied national electoral
rights. Finally, in conclusion, this Comment will argue that, for
want of political power, territorial residents constitute a discrete
and insular minority subject to heightened judicial protection.24
20. See generally Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. 24 Ediberto Roman, Empire Forgotten: The U.S.' Colonization of Puerto Rico,
42 VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1119-21 (1997).
23. This is assuming the citizens were non-felons over the age of eighteen. See
generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 & U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1; Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (explaining that the right to vote in national elections
is considered a fundamental right in modern Supreme Court jurisprudence, and that
as such, abridgement of that right triggers the Court's strict scrutiny standard,
meaning any restriction will only be sanctioned if it is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest).
24. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In Carolne
Products, Justice Jackson, discussing when the judiciary should review government
action more stringently, as opposed to the minimum rationality review approved of on
the facts of that case, stated, "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and . . . may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id.
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II. THE STATUS OF CURRENT LAW: TERRITORIAL
RESIDENTS ARE UNJUSTLY DEPRIVED OF FEDERAL
FRANCHISE RIGHTS
Current law makes it impossible for the 4.3 million Ameri-
cans 25 who reside in the territories and commonwealths of the
United States to affect laws passed by the federal government
through political representation, despite the fact that these
residents are subject to all applicable federal laws.2 s Perhaps the
most poignant example, because it involves potential death, is
that these citizens must register with the Selective Service and
subject themselves to United States military service." Citizens
residing in the American territories have served with distinction
in every United States armed conflict since 1917, and are cur-
rently serving in the war against terror in Afghanistan and Iraq.2 s
These citizens, however, can neither vote for the Commander-in-
Chief of the military, the President, who controls United States
combat, nor do they have voting representation in Congress, the
official body which declares war.2s
25. The 4.3 million total is based on United States Census estimates of the
populations for the five U.S. territories and commonwealths in mid 2004. U.S Census
Bureau, International Data Base Access, Display Mode-Total Mid Year Population at
http://www.census.gov/ip/www/idbprint.html (last visited September 7, 2004). Id. at
338.
26. "The U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico to this day continue to have no real
say in the choice of those who, from afar, really govern them, nor as to the enactment,
application and administration of the myriad of federal laws and regulations that
control almost every aspect of their daily affairs." Igartua de la Rosa v. United States,
229 F.3d 80, 88 (1st Cir. 2000) (Torruella, J., concurring).
27. United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957, 979 (D.P.R. 1968) (holding that
the Selective Service Act is applicable to U.S. citizens who reside in the territories).
For example, over 43,000 Puerto Ricans served in the Korean War. Almost 40,000
were volunteers and close to 3,540 lost their lives. This was the second highest rate of
death per capita of any jurisdiction in the United States. See Igartua de la Rosa, 229
F.3d at 89 n.19.
28. Amber Cottle noted how the military service of the residents of the District of
Columbia played a large part in the passage of the Twenty-Third Amendment giving
them the right to vote for president. "The House Committee on the Judiciary,
reporting on the proposed amendment, examined the relationship between the U.S.
and the District of Columbia in deciding whether it should pass such an amendment
... Furthermore, the committee noted that District of Columbia residents fought and
died in every U.S. war since the District was founded. Thus the committee concluded
that it was a 'constitutional anomaly' to impose 'all the obligations of citizenship
without the most fundamental of its privileges.'"(internal citations omitted). Amber
M. Cottle, Comment, Silent Citizens: U.S. Territorial Residents and the Right to Vote
in Presidential Elections, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 325-26 (1995).
29. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 & art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Territorial citizens only have non-voting members in the House of
Representatives. Since each representative has no vote s/he cannot effectively
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This disenfranchisement not only applies to American citi-
zens born and residing in the American territories, but also to
American citizens who reside in one of the fifty states and move to
a United States territory. In the latter case, the new territorial
resident is stripped of the right to vote in Presidential or Congres-
sional elections." This second-class form of citizenship is based
solely on the arbitrary criterion of locale,3' for even American citi-
zens residing abroad have the right to vote in federal elections
under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting
Act.32 Although the American territories are part of the physical
geography of the United States, the citizens residing therein are
unconstitutionally disenfranchised.3
represent the territories' people. "They [the territorial residents] can only vote for
congressional representatives who have no substantive power. The representatives
are merely weak advocates for the needs of their people rather than functioning
legislators for the nation. In the final analysis, they cannot block or promote
legislation effectively because they cannot form meaningful coalitions and they have
no vote to trade." Id. at 338.
30. See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 1994), cert.
denied 514 U.S. 1049 (1995) (holding the plaintiffs' [citizens who previously resided in
the fifty states and moved to Puerto Rico] contention that the Uniformed and
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act [which allowed citizens who moved abroad to
vote by absentee ballot] violated their rights to equal protection under the law was
invalid because the plaintiffs still had the right to vote in federal elections for a non-
voting representative in Congress) (emphasis added). Cf Cottle, supra note 27.
31. "Thus Balzac solidified the truly amazing concept that the bundle of rights of
citizenship grows and diminishes as the citizen travels from one location to another
within the physical geography of the U.S. of America!" Ballentine v. United States,
No. 1999-130, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16856, at 22 (D.V.I. Oct. 15, 2001)
(supplemental briefing ordered) (discussing the effect of the Supreme Court's
conclusion in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922), further Judge Moore
incredulously stated that as the law exists it appears that, "it is the locality that is
determinative of the application of the Constitution . . . and not the [citizenship]
status of the people who live in it.").
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff (2004). The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee
Voting Act allows American citizens who move abroad to vote by absentee ballot in
their previous state of residence.
33. For example, a passport is not needed to enter or exit American territories
from the United States. The American territories are also considered part of America
for legal purposes given the applicability of other federal laws. So, it is effectively
only in the realm of federal politics that the territories are not considered part of the
United States.
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III. THE INSULAR CASES: THE TERRITORIAL CLAUSE
AND THE LEGAL FICTION OF THE
UNINCORPORATED TERRITORY
A. Socio-Cultural Influences on the Restriction of
Franchise: Manifest Destiny and Social Darwinism
The era of American imperialism, which culminated in the
acquisition of the United States' island territories, grew out of the
historical concepts of Manifest Destiny and Social Darwinism.34
The ethos of Manifest Destiny, extant at this point in American
history, stemmed from a sense of entitlement, or the notion of an
inherent right of the American people to expand. This notion of
privilege was reified by the previous century's territorial expan-
sion westward and throughout North America. 5 The concepts of
"right, duty and mission" were emblematic of the Anglo-Saxon
Manifest Destiny ideology and its desire to civilize the world.3 6
Social Darwinism also proved an instrumental intellectual
force for the legitimization of the United States' colonial endeav-
ors. 7 Charles Darwin's "survival of the fittest" concept was trans-
posed from the world of nature to the world of the social and
political, thereby fomenting the underlying ideology that only the
fittest nations will survive in the global struggle for power.3 In
The Descent of Man, Darwin himself said of American citizens:
"there is apparently much truth in the belief that the wonderful
progress of the United States, as well as the character of the peo-
ple, [is] the result of natural selection."39 The Social Darwinists in
America framed the United States' colonial endeavors as neces-
sary against the background of other imperial powers, describing
these colonial maneuvers as a preventive measure to avoid falling
behind other nations and exposing the country to the risk of politi-
cal extinction. °
The United States acquired its various island territories for
three distinct and non-mutually exclusive reasons: military
34. Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The
Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 285 (1996).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 287.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id
40. Id. at 287. There was an intense competition for expansion in the world at the
time. A "new imperialism" was also influencing Britain, France, Germany, Russia,
and Japan to expand. Id. at 314.
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security, an expanded market for the products of American indus-
try, and a desire for national aggrandizement deriving from the
nation's status as an imperial power.41 Each of these reasons for
acquiring territory offered favorable benefits to the United States,
and although robust debate ensued regarding the desirability of
colonization42 and the constitutionality of such an action,43 the
United States eschewed principles of representative democracy,
instead creating several colonial regimes which exist today.44
B. The Changing 'Face' of Territorial Acquisition:
The Challenge of a New Type of Territorial
Resident
Shortly after the United States acquired Puerto Rico and the
Philippines in the wake of the Spanish-American War,4" questions
arose regarding the legal status of the these new territories and
their residents. Unlike prior Anglo-Saxon expansion westward,
these islands were settled by both non-Americans and non-
whites. 46 This reality posed a new legal problem for the United
States, for despite the benefits of territorial acquisition, new ques-
tions arose about controlling the territories and their non-Anglo-
Saxon populations.47
Prior to the United States' acquisition of island territories fol-
41. "In any event, military considerations can be considered the main determinant
in the decision to acquire specific territories and, eventually, in the [systematic]
establishment of direct colonial control, as opposed to informal, or indirect, economic
or political hegemony." Id. at 313 & 316.
42. "The acquisition of overseas territories as a result of the Spanish-American
War and other events opened up an intense debate regarding the future of the new
possessions. The polemic took place in Congress, academic journals, the press, and
other public forums." Id. at 237.
43. Strains of the both the imperialist and anti-imperialist movements, and legal
scholars, were among those who joined the debate over the constitutionality of the
American colonial enterprise. Id. at 238-9.
44. The Supreme Court gave the following description of representative
democracy in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963), stating, "The conception of
political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg
Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only
one thing - one person, one vote."
45. Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, T.S. no. 343.
46. Ediberto Roman and Theron Simmons, Membership Denied: Subordination
and Subrogation Under U.S. Expansionism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437, 446 (2002).
47. Roman and Simmons recognized this racial and cultural tension as giving rise
to the doctrine of the unincorporated territory. "Interestingly, this approach [the
doctrine of the unincorporated territory] which sought to limit the applicability of the
Constitution to the territories, arose after this country acquired distant lands that
were densely populated by people of color who spoke different languages ...." Id. at
458.
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lowing the Spanish American War, United States territorial
expansion was geared toward eventual statehood and incorporat-
ing each territory's residents as full-fledged American citizens.
The Northwest Ordinance of 178748 was passed by Congress to
address the political and social needs of the Northwest Territory,
and became the archetype for this early expansion: eventual
statehood and full incorporation into the body politic of the United
States.49 For example, Article III of the Treaty of 1803, which
made Louisiana part of the United States stated, "the inhabitants
of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union... and
admitted as soon as possible .. .to the enjoyment of all rights,
advantages and immunities of the citizens of the United States
"... ,50 The treaties used in the annexation of Florida, New Mex-
ico, Utah, and California each had similar provisions.5
But, the new colonial territories presented a unique dilemma.
Writing for the majority in Downes v. Bidwell," a leading Insular
Case,53 Justice Brown succinctly summed up the Supreme Court's
concerns:
It is obvious that in the annexation of outlying and distant
possessions grave questions will arise from differences of
race, habits, laws and customs of the people, and from dif-
ferences of soil, climate and production, which may require
action on the part of Congress that would be quitted unnec-
essary in the annexation of contiguous territory inhabited
only by people of the same race, or by scattered bodies of
native Indians. 4
If the Supreme Court held that the Constitution followed the flag
and applied its inherent powers, the United States would be
forced to grant the territorial peoples full constitutional rights.
That interpretation would have provided the "alien races, differ-
ing from [Americans] in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxa-
tion and modes of thought... [the] rights which peculiarly belong
to the citizens of the United States."55 According to Justice White
48. Id. at 451.
49. Id. at 452. "The eventual statehood and full incorporation archetype
envisioned that territories would become states after a period of tutelage, when
enough free males would have settled in the territory." Id.
50. Rubin Francis Weston, Racism in U.S. Imperialism: The Influence of Racial
Assumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1895-1946 188-89 (1972).
51. Id. at 189.
52. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
53. See generally, Levinson, supra note 6.
54. Downes, 182 U.S. at 282.
55. Id. at 287 & at 324 (White, J., concurring).
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in Downes, granting full constitutional rights to the territorial
inhabitants could overthrow "the whole structure of
government.""s
The jingoism and xenophobia that gave rise to the perceived
socio-cultural need for this doctrine were plainly stated by Justice
Brown writing for the plurality in Downes:
We are also of the opinion that the power to acquire territo-
ries by treaty implies not only the power to govern such ter-
ritory, but to prescribe upon what terms the United States
will receive its inhabitants, and what their status shall be
in what Chief Justice Marshall termed the 'American
Empire.' There seems to be no middle ground between this
position and the doctrine that if these inhabitants do not
become, immediately upon annexation, citizens of the
United States, their children thereafter born, whether
savages or civilized, are such, and entitled to all the rights,
privileges and immunities of citizens. If such be their sta-
tus, the consequences will be extremely serious.57
Further, he plainly stated the legal conundrum concerning territo-
rial expansion and voting rights, "Indeed it would be doubtful if
Congress would ever assent to the annexation of territory upon
the conditions that its inhabitants, however foreign they may be
to our habits, traditions and modes of life shall become at once
citizens of the United States."8 Therefore, to prevent these per-
ceived horrors, the earlier model of territorial expansion proposing
full incorporation and eventual statehood was abandoned.59 Con-
gress subsequently utilized this judicial interpretation of the Ter-
ritorial Clause to enact legislation which effectively maximized
the benefits and minimized the risks of colonial expansion.
This newly formulated presumption that Congress, and not
the Constitution, served as the arbiter of territorial residents'
rights stemmed from racist and culturally imperialist assump-
tions about the people residing in the new territories." These sup-
positions were the result of a rather shameful socio-cultural
moment in the history of the United States which weighed against
56. Id. at 313.
57. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 279-80.
59. Roman and Simmons, supra note 46 at 452-53.
60. "The obvious racism of the Court's expressions cannot be separated from
others reflecting an adherence by some members of the Court to the tenets of the
ideologies of Manifest Destiny and Social Darwinism, which were part of the
ideological framework of the dominant circles in the U.S. at the time." Ramos, supra
note 34, at 290.
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a judicial determination that the Constitution applied to the terri-
tories by its own force. In short, the theories are now vastly out-
dated at best, and morally reprehensible at worst. 1 Therefore, the
Insular Cases do not form a current and justifiable basis for con-
tinuing to deprive American citizens of their fundamental rights.
The enduring use of these cases to form the basis of that denial
when they are so out of step with current intellectual, cultural,
ideological, and even juridical paradigms is, as such, morally
reprehensible.2
C. The Supreme Court and Congressional Power: The
Legal Building Blocks of the United States
Colonial Empire
The legal questions answered by the Supreme Court in the
Insular Cases fall roughly into two groups: First, those cases con-
cerned with the political relationship of the territories to the
United States and ask, "What is the legal status of these territo-
ries?"63 and second, the cases that are concerned with civil rights
of the inhabitants and ask, "Do the rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution extend to the people in the newly
61. The author is personally offended, as an American and a resident of the
Territory of the U.S. Virgin Islands, by the fact that this racist, imperialistic, colonial
rationale is still being used in 2005 to explain why American citizens are deprived of
fundamental Constitutional rights.
62. It is worth noting that most territorial residents have become citizens since
Justice Brown first opined on the extreme seriousness of the consequences of that
status. Further under the current citizenship status even Justice Brown's analysis
would concede that because these territorial residents are citizens they should have
the rights deemed fundamental for citizens, which currently includes the right to
vote. Yet still, the 'savage' and 'alien races' residing in the American territories,
fighting in the U.S. military, traveling under U.S. passports, speaking American
English, using the American dollar, taking mandatory high school classes on
American civics and government, using the United States Postal Service, reading
American newspapers and magazines, consuming all varieties of American products,
do not have all the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens.
In his own way, Justice Brown was more progressive than current members of
the judiciary and Congress. As egregious as his sentiments were regarding the
territorial inhabitants, Brown at least acknowledged that if territorial peoples
became American citizens they would be "entitled to the rights, privileges and
immunities of citizens." Downes, 182 U.S. at 279. This position is not clearly
embraced by members of Congress, state legislatures, and the judiciary who, by their
inaction, demonstrate a belief that second-class citizenship has a justifiable place in
America today.
63. See, e.g., DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); see also Goetze v. United States
182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901).
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acquired territories?" 4 Perhaps, and most importantly, the over-
arching question with respect to both political status and civil
rights presented in the Insular Cases is: "How much power does
Congress have over the territories to determine the extent of the
rights?"65
1. The Supreme Court's Creation: The Legal
Construction of the Doctrine of Unincorporation
The judicially created doctrine of unincorporation66 grew out
of the Supreme Court's analysis of the Territorial Clause of the
Constitution. The clause states: "The United States Congress
shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and reg-
ulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the
United States."67 The Court reasoned the Territorial Clause gave
Congress virtually unlimited power to govern the territories,
because it states that Congress has the power to, "make all need-
ful rules and regulations. 68
However, the majority of the Court extended this reasoning
further, holding that the remaining protections of the Constitu-
tion did not necessarily apply to the making of those needful rules
and regulations. 9 The Court's jurisprudence established that
Congress wielded this power over territorial inhabitants' civil
rights by its ability to designate a territory as incorporated, or
unincorporated. To deem a territory incorporated would extend
the full measure of constitutional rights. To designate a territory
unincorporated, would allow Congress to curtail the extent of its
rights. Thereby, Congress was given the power to decide which
parts of the Constitution were applicable, subject only to the
Court's designation of certain rights as fundamental. 0
64. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); see also Dorr v. United
States, 195 U.S. 138, (1904); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
65. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
66. This doctrine was first articulated by Justice White in his concurrence in
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 272-3 (1901) (White, J. concurring). The doctrine of
the 'unincorporated' territory was adopted by the majority of the court in Dorr v.
United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904). Note that the words unincorporated territory do
not appear anywhere in the Constitution; this concept is a legal fiction created by the
Supreme Court.
67. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
68. Id.
69. See generally, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 272-3 (1901) (White, J.
concurring).
70. See supra Section I(B) (listing the rights deemed fundamental for territorial
residents in the Insular Cases).
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2. Congress Controls Political Status: Congress's Shifting
Conceptualization of the Political Status of the U. S.
Territories
The first Insular Case, DeLima v. Bidwell,71 established the
islands' new status under federal tariff laws. The territories' new
classifications were important because a change in status from a
foreign country to membership in the United States would result
in differential treatment under federal customs taxes and the
duties on imported goods. In DeLima the Court held that after
Puerto Rico was ceded by Spain,72 it was no longer a foreign coun-
try, but instead a domestic territory of the United States. 3 There-
fore, the tax which was levied on imports from Puerto Rico was
invalid; because Puerto Rico was classified as a domestic territory
and, under federal law, taxes are prohibited on exports from one
part of the United States to another. 4
Downes v. Bidwell,75 arguably the most well-known and
important of the Insular Cases, also involved customs duties col-
lected on imports from Puerto Rico. There was, however, a crucial
difference between the cases, because the Downes opinion was
rendered following Congress's enactment of the Foraker Act.7s
Since a similar tax was invalidated by the Supreme Court in
DeLima, and because Puerto Rico had been deemed a domestic
territory, the constitutionality of the tax levying portion of the
Foraker Act became the focal point of Downes. The basic question
was whether Congress had the constitutional authority to levy a
tax on imports from Puerto Rico. The Supreme Court answered in
the affirmative, holding that Congress did have valid authority to
tax.
Why, in seeming opposition to the holding in DeLima, was the
tax found to be constitutional? DeLima held Puerto Rico was a
domestic territory under the application of the Uniformity Clause,
which states: "The Congress shall have the power to lay and col-
lect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and pro-
71. DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901) (determining Puerto Rico's status under
the tariff laws).
72. Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art. II, T.S. No. 343 ("Spain cedes
the island of Porto Rico [sic] and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the
West Indies.").
73. See DeLima, 182 U.S. at 199-200.
74. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (Uniformity Clause).
75. Downes, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
76. Foraker Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 733, 736, 738-40, 744 (1994) (original version at ch.
191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900)).
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vide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States."77 The Court held the Uniformity
Clause was not a bar to the import tax on goods imported from
Puerto Rico in Downes because Puerto Rico was, "a territory
appurtenant and belonging to the states, but not a part of the
United States within the meaning of the revenue clauses of the
Constitution."78 Therefore, Congress could levy taxes on imports
from Puerto Rico even though it was not a foreign country under
federal tariff laws.
Taken together, DeLima and Downes represent the notion
that pursuant to plenary power under the Territorial Clause, Con-
gress could define the area as it pleased and keep Puerto Rico
unincorporated. Puerto Rico could be a domestic territory while
simultaneously "not part of the United States within the meaning
of the revenue clauses of the Constitution" if Congress so chose.79
Thus, the legal construction of the unincorporated territory ena-
bled Congress to categorize its unincorporated island acquisitions
in different ways and provided Congress a functional means to
achieve its desired ends.8"
3. Congressional Control of Civil Rights: American
Citizens Residing in the Territories Possess Different
Fundamental Rights Than Those of Other Americans
In the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court held that certain
fundamental rights applied to territorial citizens without a special
grant by Congress, including: the freedom of religion, freedom of
speech and the press, access to courts, right to liberty of person,
due process of the law, equal protection of the law, freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment. Congress has no power to abridge these
rights.81 But the right of franchise and certain judicial procedural
protections were not available save for Congress's discretion.82
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
78. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287.
79. Id.
80. One example is taxing imports from Puerto Rico to a state, even though the
Uniformity Clause would ban this tax on goods imported from another state in the
Union. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
81. Downes, 182 U.S. at 282-3.
82. Id. See supra Section 111(A) (explaining the racist and imperialist vision which
required franchise to be at Congress' discretion due to a fear of savage and alien
people overthrowing the very structure of government if they were enfranchised).
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Thus, Congress was granted the power to restrict or extend citi-
zens' rights if the citizens resided in a United States Territory. If
Congress did extend the full panoply of rights to territorial citi-
zens, the Supreme Court indicated that such action would consti-
tute incorporation." Since Congress held that power, it became
constitutionally permissible to deny territorial residents these
rights by leaving the territory unincorporated.
In Dorr v. United States, the majority of the Court adopted
the doctrine of unincorporation. In holding the right to jury trial
did not extend to Filipinos, the Court stated:
[T]he power to govern territory, implied in the right to
acquire it, and given to Congress in the Constitution in
Article IV, § 3, to whatever other limitations it may be sub-
ject, the extent which must be decided as questions arise,
does not require that body [Congress] to enact for ceded ter-
ritory, not made part of the United States by Congressional
action [incorporation], a system of laws which shall include
the right of trial by jury, and that the Constitution does
not, without legislation and of its own force, carry such
right to territory so situated.84
The Territorial Clause was interpreted to grant an extensive
amount of power to Congress, including a grant of almost full ple-
nary power over the territories and their people. This expansive
delegation was achieved through the legal fiction of the unincorpo-
rated territory, thereby enabling Congress to constitutionally
deny citizens rights deemed non-fundamental by the Court."
Thus, the Court achieved its desired result - the denial of
franchise to territorial residents by interpreting the Territorial
Clause as a Congressional carte blanche to keep a territory unin-
corporated. This broad interpretation of Congress's power under
the Territorial Clause produced the existing legal framework pro-
viding for a form of second-class of territorial citizenship. As such,
territorial citizens face an overwhelming obstacle because they
have no power to vote and influence Congressional legislation.
83. Rasmussen v. U.S., 197 U.S. 516 (1905) (holding Congress had the power to
declare Alaska an incorporated territory).
84. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149 (1904).
85. Notice that if the Court had declared the right to vote fundamental, Congress
would be required to afford that right to territorial residents as well, notwithstanding
the Territorial Clause.
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IV. VOTING IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS HAS BECOME A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP
A. Congress Expands the Franchise
1. Constitutional Amendments
Since 1870, Congress has, by Constitutional Amendment,
extended the franchise to virtually every citizen over eighteen in
the United States. Four of the sixteen amendments passed since
the Bill of Rights extended franchise to groups previously denied
participation in the political process. The Fifteenth Amendment
enfranchised former slaves, 6 the Nineteenth Amendment
enfranchised women,8 7 the Twenty-Third, residents of the District
of Columbia, 8 and the Twenty-Sixth, citizens who were over eigh-
teen. 9 These grants evidenced a legislative trend recognizing a
broadly inclusive political process.
Further expanding the ability of Americans to directly partici-
pate in the political process, Congress passed the Seventeenth
Amendment, which provides for direct election of United States
Senators, as well as the Twenty-Fourth Amendment which says
the right to vote cannot be abridged by a failure to pay a poll tax
or any other tax.90 These affirmative Congressional actions pro-
vide a constitutional manifestation that the right to vote is funda-
mental for citizens of the United States of America.
2. Legislation
To actualize the constitutional amendments, Congress has
legislated affirmatively to allow citizens to freely exercise their
voting rights. For example, Congress demonstrated its commit-
ment to achieve full participation in the political process by pass-
ing the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970 ("Amendments").9' The 1970 Amendments
attempted to lower the minimum age of voters in state and federal
elections from 21 to 18.92 In addition, the Amendments barred the
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI & amend. XXIV, §1.
91. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314
(1970) (amending The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973 (1965)).
92. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970). In addition, the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment, giving citizens over the age of eighteen the right vote, was passed
in 1971. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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use of literacy tests and similar voting eligibility requirements for
a period of five years in any state or federal election where such
tests were not already proscribed by the Voting Rights Act of
1965."s It was also forbidden for states to impose durational resi-
dency requirements barring new state residents from voting in
federal elections, and the Amendments provided uniform rules for
absentee balloting in those elections as well. The Supreme Court
found constitutional support for Congress's broadly inclusive
efforts and upheld the majority of the Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments of 1970, only invalidating the requirement that to vote in
local elections voters had to be 18 years of age.94
B. The Supreme Court: Contemporary Jurisprudence
Defines Franchise as a Fundamental Right of
Citizenship
One of the most eloquent descriptions of the right of
franchise, its fundamental nature, and its jurisprudential history
is articulated by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims.95 There,
the Court stated that the Constitution undeniably protects the
right of all qualified citizens to vote in both state and federal elec-
tions. 6 As the Court noted in Reynolds, it has been recognized
repeatedly that all qualified voters have a constitutionally pro-
tected right to vote.97 Racially based gerrymandering has been
held unconstitutional because it denies some citizens the right to
vote. The Court further stated:
And history has seen a continuing expansion of the scope of
the right to suffrage in this country. The right to vote
freely for the candidate of one's choice is the essence of a
democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike
at the heart of representative government. 99
The Reynolds opinion concludes its discussion on the fundamental
nature of voting rights by arguing that the right to suffrage is a
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society, preservative
of other basic civil and political rights, and that any infringement
93. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970).
94. Id. at 117-119.
95. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
96. The Court made this indelibly clear by citing a consistent line of its decisions
on the issue. Id. at 555.
97. See id. at 554 (citing Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884)).
98. Id. at 555. (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1968)).
99. Id. See also id. at 555 n.28.
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on the right thereof must be meticulously scrutinized.100
C. Given Contemporary Conceptions of Voting Rights,
the Antiquated Holdings of the Insular Cases Fail
to Justify the Disenfranchisement of Territorial
Residents
In 1885, the Supreme Court stated:
The personal and civil rights of the inhabitants of the terri-
tories are secured to them, as to other citizens, by the prin-
ciples of constitutional liberty which restrain all the
agencies of government, state and national; their political
rights are franchises which they hold as privileges in the
legislative discretion of the Congress of the United
States.'
At the time this case was decided, the right to vote was limited to
men over twenty-one. Subsequent constitutional amendments, 102
legislative acts,0 3 and judicial decisions TM expounded that limited
suffrage right. The reasoning of the Insular Cases, however, hear-
kens back to an era of limited franchise, embracing a concept that
is discordant with contemporary ideology, and functioning as the
legal justification for the disenfranchisement of American citizens.
The absurdity of applying these antiquated Territorial Clause
interpretations in a contemporary setting is underscored by Con-
stitutional amendments and by the Supreme Court granting vir-
tually every other American citizen over eighteen the
100. Id. at 562. (emphasis added) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886),
and enunciating that over a century ago, the Yick Wo Court referred to the "political
franchise of voting" as "a fundamental political right, because preservative of all
rights.")
It is also worth noting that Yick Wo was decided before the Insular Cases were
heard by the Supreme Court. At the time of those decisions, the Court did consider
voting a fundamental right (at least for male citizens of the United States). However,
it was not among the fundamental rights guaranteed to territorial residents, male or
otherwise, thus giving further support to the deliberate racial, cultural, and colonial
exclusion of territorial citizens from the political process.
101. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1885) (emphasis added).
102. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (enfranchising former slaves); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX (creating the women's right to vote ); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII
(enfranchising the residents of the District of Columbia); U.S. CONST. amend. XVIV
(abolishing poll taxes as a requisite to voting); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI
(enfranchising citizens over the age of eighteen).
103. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314
(1970) (amending The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973 (1965)).
104. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, (1964); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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fundamental right to vote in federal elections. If this contempo-
rary understanding of fundamental voting rights is to be consist-
ently applied, the rights granted to territorial residents through
the Insular Cases must be expanded to include voting as well.
V. CONCLUSION: THE JUDICIARY MUST STEP IN AND
HELP ENFRANCHISE A DISCRETE AND INSULAR
MINORITY THAT IS UTTERLY UNPROTECTED
BY THE POLITICAL PROCESS
The most direct way to achieve voting rights for territorial
residents would be to pass a Constitutional amendment granting
territories the power to appoint electors as if they were states.
The residents of the District of Columbia were enfranchised in
this way by the Twenty Third Amendment. 105 But, in order to
have a Constitutional amendment proposed and passed, the terri-
torial residents need judicial support."'
Article V of the United States Constitution sets for that an
amendment to the Constitution must be proposed in one of two
ways: by two-thirds of both the United States House of Represent-
atives and the United States Senate or by a constitutional conven-
tion called by two-thirds of the state legislatures.0 7 The proposed
amendment must then be approved by either three-fourths of the
state legislatures or conventions in three-fourths of the states.
Under these parameters, territorial residents become the quintes-
sential discrete and insular minority; they have no political power
in Congress.'
The judiciary should exercise its authority to ameliorate this
colonial regime and enfranchise this discrete and insular minority
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1. "The District constituting the seat of
government of the U.S. shall appoint in such a manner as the Congress may direct: A
number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of
Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it
were a state. they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they
shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to
be electors appointed by a state . .
106. U.S. CONST. art. V.
107. Id.
108. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (discussing
when the judiciary should review government action more stringently, as opposed to
the minimum rationality review approved of on the facts of that case, Justice Jackson
stated, "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities, and . . . may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry").
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who cannot protect itself politically. One solution would be for the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a case where American terri-
torial citizens seek to challenge the constitutionality of their dis-
enfranchisement. °9 The Court should broaden the definition of
fundamental rights espoused in the Insular Cases to make it coex-
tensive with contemporary jurisprudence on fundamental rights
of other national citizens, such as the right to vote in national
elections and to travel and settle interstate."' Then, the right to
vote in national elections would become a fundamental right for
American citizens residing in the United States territories. As a
result, the Supreme Court would effectively be endorsing a rein-
terpretation of Article II, Section 2"' of the Constitution, because
territorial residents must be allowed electors if their right to vote
is determined to be fundamental.'
This result is substantiated by the Court's decision in Bush v.
Gore." '3 In that case, the Court held that the Constitution does not
necessarily guarantee each individual citizen the right to have
their vote counted, since electors represent the aggregate of the
individual voters' interests. Therefore, if the American citizens
residing in United States territories have the fundamental right
to vote, they have the correlative right to have electors who
represent their interests in presidential elections.
Similarly, if the Supreme Court holds the right to vote in
national elections fundamental for territorial residents, the right
will be protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 4 Although the Equal Protection Clause protects cit-
izens against impermissible infringement of their fundamental
109. Ballentine v. United States, Civ. No. 1999-130, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16856
(V.I. Oct. 15, 2001) (supplemental briefing ordered).
110. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561 ("Undoubtedly the right of suffrage is a fundamental
matter in a free and democratic society.... ."); See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (holding that a one-year waiting period for welfare benefits for welfare
recipients moving to a new state impermissibly impinged on those recipients
fundamental right to travel); See also Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1978) ("For
the purposes of this opinion we may also assume that there is virtually unqualified
constitutional right to travel between Puerto Rico and any of the 50 states of the
Union.").
111. "Each state shall appoint, in such a manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a number of electors ...." U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
112. American citizens do not have to be residents of states to vote for President
and Vice President. The residents of the District of Columbia are and example, they
have the right to appoint electors and thus vote in presidential elections. U.S.
CONST. amend XXIII, § 1.
113. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 cl. 4.
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rights by the States, it also guarantees strict scrutiny against sim-
ilar actions by the federal government."5 As a result, Congress
would no longer have the discretionary power, which was initially
granted by the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases, to extend or
restrict the rights of territorial residents to vote in federal elec-
tions. In short, the powers granted by the Supreme Court under
the Constitution can also be modified or removed by the Supreme
Court under the Constitution. Therefore, if the Supreme Court re-
conceptualized the term 'fundamental' in the Insular Cases to be
consonant with the concept of fundamental rights for American
citizens not residing in the territories, there would no longer be a
legal mechanism for territorial disenfranchisement.
115. Equal protection of the laws is enforced against the federal government
through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl.
4.; See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that just as the Constitution
does not allow the states to maintain racially segregated public schools under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congressionally maintained
racial segregation in the District of Columbia was also unconstitutional under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
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